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Recent Development Note
The Need for Legislative Action to Abolish
Interspousal Immunity: Varholla v. Varholla
Varholla v. Varholla' presented the Supreme Court of Ohio with the
opportunity to reconsider its 1965 holding in Lyons v. Lyons2 that
negligence actions between spouses were precluded in Ohio by the doctrine
of interspousal immunity. The plaintiff in Varholla brought an action
seeking damages for personal injuries she allegedly sustained because of
her husband's negligent operation of a motor vehicle. The defendant's
motion for summary judgment on the ground that he was immune from
suit by his spouse was granted by the trial court. The court of appeals
affirmed. In a six-to-one decision the Supreme Court of Ohio chose to
stand by its decision in Lyons.
At common law it had been impossible to maintain actions between
spouses because of the legal fiction that husband and wife were one Not
until the passage of the statutes known as Married Women's Acts4 did a
married woman gain a separate legal identity. These statutes, however,
were primarily viewed by the courts as only "free[ing] the wife from the
husband's control of her property."5 Many courts, including those in Ohio,
refused to interpret the statutes as abolishing the common law prohibition
against tort actions between spouses. Instead, these courts retained
interspousal immunity in tort actions on policy grounds.
6
In 1965 when Lyons was decided, the majority of jurisdictions
adhered to the doctrine of interspousal immunity.7 Presently twenty-nine
1. 56 Ohio St. 2d 269, 383 N.E.2d 888 (1978).
2. 2 Ohio St. 2d 243, 208 N.E.2d 533 (1965). In Lyons the court retreated from its earlier
liberalizing trend in the intrafamily immunity area, and asserted that negligence actions between
spouses were barred in Ohio by the common law doctrine of interspousal immunity. Fora thorough
discussion of these earlier cases and Lyons, see Sullivan, fntra-Fanily Immunity and the Law ofTorts
in Ohio, 18 W. RES. L. REv. 447 (1967).
3. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs, § 122, at 859-60 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as PROSSER].
4. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2307.09 and 2323.09 (Page 1954):
§ 2307.09 MARRIED WOMAN MAY SUE AND BE SUED.
A married woman may sue and be sued as if she were unmarried, and her husband may
be joined with her only when the cause of action is in favor of or against both.
§ 2323.09 JUDGMENT AGAINST MARRIED WOMAN.
When a married woman sues or is sued, like proceedings shall be had and judgment
rendered and enforced as if she were unmarried. Her property and estate shall be liable for a
judgment against her ....
5. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 861.
6. Id. at 862-63; see also Lyons v. Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 2d 243, 244,208 N.E.2d 533,535 (1965);
Lewis v. Lewis, 351 N.E.2d 526 (Mass. 1976).
7. See Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 632, 636 (1955).
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states permit a negligence action like the one brought by Mrs. Varholla. 8
Only twenty-one states and the District of Columbia still prohibit motor
vehicle negligence actions between spouses.9
Thus, for the second time in fourteen years, the court refused to
abolish this outdated immunity and Ohio, therefore, remains one of a
shrinking number of jurisdictions retaining it. In Lyons, the court cited the
three traditional reasons for retaining the immunity: (1) that abolishing
interspousal immunity is a legislative rather than a judicial task; (2) that
interspousal immunity is necessary to promote marital harmony; and (3)
that interspousal immunity prevents fraud and collusion against insurance
companies.'l The Varholla court simply stated that it thought these
considerations were still valid, thus ignoring the persuasive arguments of
other state supreme courts that have recently abolished interspousal
immunity. Those courts declared that the three considerations upon which
the Ohio court relied did not justify the immunity.
Because interspousal immunity is a judicially created doctrine it is
subject to amendment, modification, or abrogation by the courts, I and the
Varholla court was incorrect in claiming that the immunity must be
8. Bennett v. Bennett, 224 Ala. 335, 140 So. 378 (1932); Cramer v. Cramer, 379 P.2d 95 (Alas.
1963); Leach v. Leach, 227 Ark. 599, 300 S.W.2d 15 (1957); Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal, 2d 692,376 P,2d 70,
26 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962); Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19,46 P.2d 740(1935); Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42,
89 A. 889 (1914) (by implication); Rogers v. Yellowstone Park Co., 97 Idaho 14,539 P.2d 566 (1974);
Brooks v. Layne, 433 S.W.2d 116 (Ky. 1968); Soirez v. Great American Ins. Co., 168 So. 2d 418 (La.
App. 1964) (construing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (West 1978), to permit suit by one spouse against
the other's insurer, but not directly against spouse); Lewis v. Lewis, 351 N.E.2d 526 (Mass, 1976);
Hosko v. Hosko, 385 Mich. 39, 187 N.W.2d 236 (1971); Beaudette v. Frana, 385 Minn. 366, 173
N.W.2d 416 (1969); Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397,528 P.2d 1013(1974); Lundbergv. Hagen, 114 N.H.
110, 316 A.2d 177 (1974); Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 267 A.2d 481 (1970); Maestas v. Overton, 87
N.M. 213, 531 P.2d 947 (1975); Henry v. Henry, 291 N.C. 156, 229 S.E.2d 158 (1976); Fitzmauriee V.
Fitzmaurice, 62 N.D. 191, 242 N.W. 526 (1932); Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660
(1938); Digby v. Digby, 388 A.2d I (R.I. 1978); Prosser v. Prosser, 114 S.C. 45, 102 S.E. 787 (1920);
Scotvold v. Scotvold, 68 S.D. 53, 298 N.W. 266 (1941); Richard v. Richard, 131 Vt. 98, 300 A2d 637
(1973); Surratt v. Thompson, 212 Va. 191, 183 S.E.2d 200 (1971); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183,
500 P.2d 771 (1972); Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, 244 S.E.2d 338 (W. Va. 1978); Zelinger v. State Sand
& Gravel Co., 38 Wis. 2d 98, 156 N.W.2d 466 (1968); N.Y. GEN. OaL. LAW § 3-313 (McKinney 1978).
9. Burns v. Burns, III Ariz. 178,526 P.2d 717 (1974) (interspousal immunity, however, does not
bar a former spouse from suing for an intentional tort inflicted during marriage); Short Line, Inc. v.
Perez, 238 A.2d 341 (Del. 1968); Mountjoy v. Mountjoy, 121 U.S. App. D.C. 27,206 A.2d 733, appeal
denied, 347 F.2d 811 (1965); Eddleman v. Eddleman, 183 Ga. 766,189 S.E. 833 (1937) (dictum); Flogel
v. Flogel, 257 Iowa 547, 133 N.W.2d 907 (1965); Miles v. West, 224 Kan. 284, 580 P.2d 876 (1978);
Moulton v. Moulton, 309 A.2d 224 (Me. 1973) (tortious conduct occurring during marriage by one
spouse against other creates no cause of action, but wife may sue husband during marriage for tortious
injury occurring prior to marriage); Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 390 A.2d 77 (1978) (but wife can
maintain action when outrageous, intentional tort is alleged); McNeal v. McNeal's Estate, 254 So. 2d
521 (Miss. 1971); Ebel v. Ferguson, 478 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. 1972); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v.
Leary, 168 Mont. 482,544 P.2d 444 (1975); Emerson v. Western Seed & Irrigation Co., 116 Neb. 180,
216 N.W. 297 (1927); Varholla v. Varholla, 56 Ohio St. 2d 269,383 N.E.2d 888 (1978); Apitzv. Dames,
205 Or. 242, 287 P.2d 585 (1955) (interspousal immunity is not a bar in actions based on intentional
torts); Digirolamo v. Apanavage, 454 Pa. 557, 312 A.2d 382 (1973); Childress v. Childress, 569 SW,2d
816 (Tenn. 1978) (prenuptial injury claims can be brought during marriage); Bounds v. Caudle, 560
S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1977) (interspousal immunity abolished in willful and intentional tort cases);
Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 384 P.2d 389 (1963); McKinney v. McKinney, 59 Wyo. 204,
135 P.2d 940 (1943); HAWAii REV. STAT. § 573-5 (1968); ILL. ANN. STAT. cit. 68, § I (Smith-Hurd 1959),
10. 56 Ohio St. 2d at 270, 383 N.E.2d at 889 (1978).
11. See e.g., Lewis v. Lewis, 351 N.E.2d 526 (Mass. 1976); Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397,528
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abolished only by the legislature and not by the judiciary. Nevertheless,
because the court has consistently refused to abolish the immunity, it is
incumbent upon the legislature to take action to abolish this anachronistic
and unfair doctrine. Indeed, "there is something wanting in a system of
justice which permits strangers, friends, relatives, and emancipated
children to recover injuries suffered as a result of their driver's negligence
but denies the right to the driver's spouse . .. . The invidiousness of an
immunity preventing interspousal suits is made even clearer by the fact
that the remaining reasons put forth by the court for retaining interspousal
immunity do not support its retention.
The majority in Varholla also noted that interspousal immunity was
necessary to promote marital harmony. A flaw in this argument was shown
by the Supreme Court of Washington in Freehe v. Freehe:1
3
If a state of peace and tranquility exists between the spouses, then the
situation is such that either no action will be commenced or that the
spouses-who are, after all, the best guardians of their own peace and
tranquility-will allow the action to continue only so long as their personal
harmony is notjeopardized. If peace and tranquility is nonexistent or tenuous
to begin with, then the law's imposition of a technical disability seems more
likely to be a bone of contention than a harmonizing factor.
A second problem with this argument is that by statute15 spouses may sue
one another in contract and property actions. These actions are just as
likely to disrupt marital harmony as a tort action, but they are permitted.
To permit suit to remedy all wrongs except personal torts "runs against our
fundamental concept of tort law. . . . The state of matrimony alone is
not a sufficient justification for preventing suit on an actionable wrong."'' 6
The final argument for retaining interspousal immunity in Varholla
was that interspousal immunity prevents fraud and collusion against
P.2d 1013 (1974); Freehev. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183,500P.2d771 (1972). The SupremeJudicial Court
of Massachusetts stated:
[I]t is within the power and authority of the court to abrogate thisjudicially created rule;, and
the mere longevity of the rule does not by itself provide cause for us to stay our hand if to
perpetuate the rule would be to perpetuate inequity. When the rationales which gave meaning
and coherence to a judicially created rule are no longer vital, and the rule itself is not
consonant with the needs ofcontemporarysociety, a court not only has the authority but also
the duty to reExamine its precedents rather than to apply by rote an antiquated formula.
Lewis v. Lewis, 351 N.E.2d 526, 531 (Mass. 1976).
The Ohio Supreme Court, moreover, found no need to defer to the legislature when it abolished
charitable hospital immunity in Avellone v. St. John's Hospital, 165 Ohio St 467, 135 N.E.2d 410
(1956), or governmental immunity for municipally owned hospitals in Sears v. Cincinnati,31 Ohio St.
2d 157, 285 N.E.2d 732 (1972).
12. Immer v. Risko, 56 NJ. 482, 495, 267 A.2d 481, 488 (1970).
13. 81 Wash. 2d 183, 500 P.2d 771 (1972).
14. Id. at 187, 500 P.2d at 774.
15. See note 4 supra.
16. Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397,402, 528 P.2d 1013,1016 (1974). Cf. O111o CoN5T. art. 1, § 16
(Page 1955), which states: "All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his
land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice
administered without denial or delay." See also Justice W. Brown's dissent in Varholla in which he
argues that interspousal immunity is unconstitutional. 56 Ohio St. 2d at 273-275,383 N.E.2d at 891-92.
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tactically disadvantaged insurance companies. This rationale can be
attacked in two ways. First, the courts always have the task of weeding out
fraudulent claims from true ones. It is the function of the finder of fact to
ascertain the truth; "the testimony of both parties will be extremely
vulnerable to impeachment at a trial on the grounds of bias, interest and
prejudice. 1 7 Indeed, in Primes v. Tyler,"8 the Ohio Supreme Court held
the Ohio guest statute to be unconstitutional despite the state's argument
that it prevented fraudulent claims. In so holding, the court quoted from a
North Dakota Supreme Court decision:
In all other cases, we rely upon the standard remedies of perjury, the efficacy
of cross-examination, the availability of pretrial discovery, and the good
sense of juries to detect false testimony if it should occur. We do not withdraw
the remedy from all injured persons in order to avoid a rare recovery based
upon false testimony.
This reasoning is just as valid in interspousal suits as it was in guest-driver
suits. 20 Another problem with the court's third rationale is that
interspousal immunity is not necessary to protect insurance companies.
Insurance companies can either exempt spouses from coverage 21 or raise
the premiums for such coverage.
Since the Supreme Court of Ohio has continually refused to abolish
interspousal immunity in negligence actions, the onus is upon the
legislature to take action. There are two approaches open to the legislature.
One approach would be to abolish the immunity only when the defendant
is insured.22 The advantage of this approach is that the presence of
insurance would minimize any adverse effect of the litigation on marital
harmony. Furthermore, since most drivers are insured, many of the
interspousal suits arising out of motor vehicle accidents could still be
maintained under this approach.
A second approach is to abolish the immunity in all instances,
regardless of insurance status. This approach is preferable. If one spouse
wishes to bring suit against the other spouse in the absence of insurance, it
is unlikely that marital harmony exists. Prohibiting suit on the basis of
17. Brooks v. Robinson, 259 Ind. 16, 22, 284 N.E.2d 794, 797 (1972),
18. 43 Ohio St. 2d 195, 331 N.E.2d 723 (1975).
19. Id. at 201,331 N.E.2d at 727, quotingJohnson v. Hasett, 217 N.W.2d 771,778 (N.D. 1974).
20. As pointed out by the Supreme Court of New Jersey,
it is ironic that the presence of insurance has spawned the second rationale . . . of
protecting the insurance carriers against fraud and collusion. That rationale belies the
possibility that domestic harmony will be disturbed since its very premise is that the
interspousal relationship is so harmonious that fraud and collusion will result.
Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 489, 267 A.2d 481, 485 (1970).
21. See generally Casey, The Trend of Interspousal and Parental Immunity-Cakewalk
Liability, 45 INs. COUNSEL J. 321 (1978). The author argues that such exclusions be enlarged to cover all
relatives of the insured.
22. This approach is followed in Louisiana. Louisiana's direct action statute permits a suit by
one spouse against the other's insurer. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (West 1978). If the otherspouse is
uninsured, however, interspousal immunity prohibits suit. Soirez v. Great American Ins, Co., 168
So.2d 418 (La. App. 1964).
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interspousal immunity will only exacerbate marital disharmony. The only
alternative presently open to the one spouse is to suffer damages with no
hope of recovery. Under existing law in Ohio a spouse can bring suit
seeking damages from the other spouse in contract and property law.
There is no justification for interspousal immunity prohibiting such action
in negligent torts. Nor is there any justification for abolishing the immunity
only when the defendant is insured.
Gary N. Sales
23. In Ohio interspousal immunityattaches both at the time ofthe tort and at the time of the suit.
In Varholla the court held that the immunity attaches when the married parties are living together as
husband and wife at the time of the alleged injury. 56 Ohio St.2d at 269, 383 N.E.2d at 889. InThomas
v. Herron, 20 Ohio St. 2d 62,253 N.E.2d 772(1969), the court held that a negligent tort suit could not be
maintained between spouses presently living together for injuries sustained prior to marriage even
though the action was filed 17 days before they were married.

